

A SIXTH-CENTURY MANUAL OF INDIAN LOGIC\*

(*A Translation of the NYĀYAPRAVEŚĀ*)

INTRODUCTION

1. *The Text of The NYĀYAPRAVEŚĀ*

The history of Indian logic may be divided into three periods, old Nyāya, Buddhist logic, and new Nyāya. The sixth century A.D., the efflorescence of the second period, was characterized by the establishment of the doctrine of Dignāga (circa A.D. 480–540).<sup>1</sup> Śāṅkarasvāmin, who is said to have been a disciple of Dignāga,<sup>2</sup> composed the *Nyāyapraveśa* as an introduction to Dignāga's doctrine.<sup>3</sup> This work seems to have been popular even among the Jains, for Haribhadra, a Jain, wrote a commentary on it in the eleventh century or slightly earlier.<sup>4</sup>

Hsüan Tsang (A.D. 602–664) made a Chinese translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*,<sup>5</sup> and his disciple K'uei Chi<sup>6</sup> and others commented on it. Hsüan Tsang's translation has been one of the most important textbooks for the science of Buddhist logic in China as well as in Japan. We have two Tibetan translations, one from the Sanskrit,<sup>7</sup> and the other from Hsüan Tsang's Chinese translation.<sup>8</sup>

The Sanskrit text was published by B. Dhruva for the first time in 1930 (G.O.S. ed. No. 38).<sup>9</sup> N. D. Mironov had another edition printed in *T'oung Pao* the next year.<sup>10</sup> Having compared these Sanskrit texts with the Chinese translation, H. Ui concluded that the Chinese translation represents the form closest to the original, and that there should be some later interpolations in those Sanskrit editions which have been published so far. Thus realizing the value of the Chinese translation, he published another edition in 1944.<sup>11</sup>

I will use Dhruva's edition (D) as the basic text of the following translation, and point out differences between the Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation in the notes.

2. *The Contents of The Nyāyapraveśa*

The *Nyāyapraveśa* deals with the following topics:

Means of proof (*sādhana*): The statements comprising a correct syllogism, capable of convincing others.

Fallacious means of proof (*sādhanābhāsa*): The defective statements incapable of convincing others;

Means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*).

Fallacious means of refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

Fallacious perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) and fallacious inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

The first two topics are the main concern of our treatise.

### 3. *Property (Dharma) and Property-possessor (Dharmin)*

The relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* plays a fundamental role in the Indian system of inference. Indian logicians conducted their inference on the basis of the *dharma-dharmin* relation. Here the word ‘*dharma*’ means a property while ‘*dharmin*’ designates a property-possessor. The concepts of property and property-possessor are complementary to each other. The *dharma-dharmin* relation may be formulated as follows:

When *x* occurs in *y*, *x* is the property (*dharma*) and *y* is the property-possessor (*dharmin*).

The property-possessor may be regarded as the locus or the substratum in or upon which the property rests. For instance, when there is smoke on a mountain, the smoke is the property; the mountain, the property-possessor.

The statements comprising Indian syllogism have the fundamental form: there is a property in a property-possessor. The statement “There is fire on the mountain” has that form, for instance. Of course, other forms are also used, but in Sanskrit they can be smoothly transformed into the form: There is a property in a property-possessor. For example, the meaning of “Sound is impermanent” is expressed by “*anityaḥ śabdaḥ.*” (*Anityaḥ* is nom. sg., meaning ‘impermanent’, *śabdaḥ* is also nom. sg., meaning sound. Usually a copula is not written in Sanskrit.) This Sanskrit sentence can be rewritten as “*śabdasya anityatvam.*” (The suffix ‘-tva’ is attached to the stem ‘*anitya*’ while ‘*śabdaḥ*’ is replaced by its genitive ‘*śabdasya*’. The suffix ‘-tva’ has the function of making an ab-

stract noun, hence ‘*anityatva*’ means ‘impermanence’.) A literal translation of “*śabdasya anityatvam*” may be “There is impermanence in sound.” This rewriting makes one see clearly that the property, impermanence, resides in the property-possessor, sound.

The concepts of property and property-possessor become clearer when compared with the concepts of subject and predicate. The terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ refer to words in a sentence, while the terms ‘property’ and ‘property-possessor’ to objects which may be denoted by words in a sentence. The *dharma-dharmin* relation is independent of the syntactic connection. For instance, in the sentence “Sound is impermanent” the subject is the word ‘sound’ while in the sentence “Impermanence resides in sound” the subject has shifted to the word ‘impermanence’. In both cases, however, sound remains the property-possessor. The predicate and the property can be understood in an analogous way.

#### 4. *The Basic Structure of Indian Syllogism*

There are two kinds of Indian Syllogisms – five-membered<sup>12</sup> and three-membered. The latter may be exemplified by the following:

- (a) There is fire on the mountain,
- (b) because of smoke.
- (c) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a fireplace.

In (a), fire is the property and the mountain is the property-possessor or locus; (b) points out that the property, smoke, rests upon the locus, the mountain. (c) can be rewritten as: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as for instance, there are smoke and fire in a fireplace. Thus in each of the sentences (a), (b), and (c), a *dharma-dharmin* relation or the combination of *dharma-dharmin* relations is expressed. We may, therefore, understand the meaning of (a), (b), and (c) in the following way:

- (a) The arguer wishes to prove that there is fire on the mountain.
- (b) By pointing out smoke on the same mountain, he gives the inferential mark by which one can infer that there is fire on the mountain.

- (c) He shows that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and he gives as an example a fireplace where there are both fire and smoke.

The existence of fire on the mountain is proved by the existence of smoke on the same mountain and by the fact that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. To generalize, the existence of a property in its locus is proved by the existence of another property in the same locus, and by the fact that wherever there is the latter property, there is the former property.

Another instance of the three-membered Indian syllogism is given by:

- (a) Sound is impermanent,  
 (b) because of 'produced-ness' (or because of [its] property of being produced).  
 (c) Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot.

Though (a) may not seem to express in a direct manner the *dharma-dharmin* relation, the relation is surely implied in (a), which will become explicit if we transform (a) into "There is impermanence in sound." (b) is to be regarded as a shortened form of "because of 'produced-ness' in sound," or "because there is 'produced-ness' in sound." (c) may be rewritten as "Wherever there is 'produced-ness', there is impermanence; as for instance, there are 'produced-ness' and impermanence in a pot." Like the previous case, in each of the sentences (a), (b) and (c), a *dharma-dharmin* relation or the combination of *dharma-dharmin* relations is expressed. We may, therefore, understand the meaning of (a), (b) and (c) in the following manner:

- (a) The arguer wishes to prove that there is impermanence in sound.  
 (b) By pointing out 'produced-ness' in sound, he gives the inferential mark by which he can infer that there is impermanence in sound.  
 (c) He shows that wherever there is 'produced-ness', there is impermanence, and he gives as an example a pot, where there are both 'produced-ness' and impermanence.

Here, also, the essential point is that the existence of impermanence in sound is proved by the existence of 'produced-ness' in sound.

When, in these two syllogisms, we substitute

'Locus *l*' for 'mountain' or 'sound',

'Property *p*' for 'fire' or 'impermanence',

'Property *q*' for 'smoke' or 'produced-ness',

'Locus *w*' for 'fireplace' or 'pot',

we get the following schema of the three-membered Indian syllogism:

- (a) There is Property *p* in Locus *l*,
- (b) because there is Property *q* (in Locus *l*).
- (c) Wherever there is Property *q*, there is Property *p*, as in Locus *w*.

I will call this Schema 1.

The terminology of Indian logic has been arranged in such a way as to refer to factors such as Property *p*, Property *q*, Locus *w*, etc., but not to the subject, the predicate, etc., of a sentence. Property *p* is called the *sādhya*; Property *q*, the *hetu* or the mark; and Locus *w*, the example.

### 5. The *Pakṣa*

Roughly speaking, the *pakṣa* is the subject or the locus of inference. It is defined in our text as follows:

The *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by a recognized qualifier. (Cf. translation p. 120)

In Schema 1, the *pakṣa* is Locus *l* which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by Property *p*. When one wants to prove that there is fire on the mountain, the *pakṣa* is the mountain where fire must be proved to exist. To give another example, in the case of proving that sound is impermanent, the *pakṣa* is sound which must be proved to be qualified by impermanence. Thus a *pakṣa* has to fulfill two conditions: It must be a property-possessor, and it must be qualified by a property.

In the definition of the *pakṣa* our author, Śāṅkarasvāmin, adds the adjective 'recognized' (*prasiddha*) to both 'qualifier' and 'property-possessor'. This modification is intended to show that one must admit

the existence of both the qualifier (i.e., the property) and the property-possessor. For instance, the existence of a mountain is universally admitted. The horn of a rabbit, however, is not admitted to be existent. Whenever the existence of the horn of a rabbit is subject to dispute, it would be implausible, our author thinks, to argue whether the color white resides in the horn of a rabbit. The existence of a unicorn is not admitted, either. Therefore, it would be impossible to argue whether a unicorn is on a mountain or not. A unicorn, the horn of a rabbit, etc., thus cannot play the role of the property or the property-possessor in this system.

#### 6. *The Inferable Property (Sādhyā-dharma) and the Reason (Sādhana-dharma)*

The property the arguer wishes to prove to exist in the *pakṣa* is called a *sādhyā*, such as Property *p* in Schema 1. The property to be referred to when one wishes to prove the *sādhyā* to exist in the *pakṣa* is called a *sādhana* or *hetu*, such as Property *q* in Schema 1. Therefore, the relation between a *sādhyā* and a *hetu* can be expressed as follows: The existence of a *sādhyā* in its locus is proved by the existence of the *hetu* in the same locus.

#### 7. *The Mark (hetu)*

The *hetu* (*sādhana-dharma*) is also called a mark. (Although ‘*hetu*’ primarily means ‘reason’, I translate it by ‘mark’ to avoid giving the impression that the *hetu* is a proposition rather than a property. In other texts ‘*liṅga*’ (literally meaning ‘mark’) is also used for the *hetu*.) For instance, smoke rising from a mountain is given as the mark by which one can infer that there is fire on the mountain.

A correct mark must possess the following three aspects.

#### 8. *The First Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The first aspect of a correct mark is that *it be a property of the pakṣa (pakṣadharmatva)*. For instance, when smoke is given as the mark of fire’s belonging to the mountain, the *pakṣa*, the smoke, must be a property of the same mountain. Smoke rising from a place other than that mountain cannot be accepted as a correct mark. Likewise, when one wants

to prove that sound is impermanent, the mark, 'produced-ness', must be seen in the sound.

### 9. *The Second Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The second aspect of a correct mark is that *it be present in the sapakṣa* (*sapakṣe sattvam*). The 'sapakṣa' means anything which is similar to the *pakṣa* insofar as it possesses the *sādhya*. When one wishes to prove that there is fire on the mountain, a fireplace is an instance of the *sapakṣa*, because it possesses fire.

It is not yet known for certain whether the mountain, the *pakṣa*, possesses fire, but it is certain that a fireplace possesses fire. Even though there is such a difference between the way the *pakṣa* possesses the *sādhya* and the way the *sapakṣa* possesses the *sādhya*, this difference is to be put aside when the *sapakṣa* is said to be similar to the *pakṣa*.

The term 'sapakṣa' refers to an individual member of a class, not to a class considered as a single collective entity. For example, the fireplace mentioned as an instance of the *sapakṣa* is a member of the class Fireplace, not the class Fireplace. Smoke or fire can upon a fireplace, but not upon the class Fireplace taken as an abstract entity.

To possess the second aspect, a mark need not be present in all the *sapakṣa*. Let us consider, for instance, an iron ball red-hot by heat. When the *pakṣa* is the mountain where the existence of fire is to be proved, the red-hot ball is a *sapakṣa*, since it has fire. Smoke, which can obviously be accepted as a correct mark, however, is not present in the ball. Hence, the second aspect of a correct mark could be more precisely expressed as follows: The mark must be present in all or some *sapakṣa*.

### 10. *The Third Aspect of a Correct Mark*

The third aspect of a correct mark is that *it not be present in the vipakṣa* (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*). The 'vipakṣa' means anything dissimilar to the *pakṣa*, insofar as it does not possess the *sādhya*. When the *pakṣa* is the mountain to be qualified by fire, a lake can be given as an instance of the *vipakṣa*, for it is well-known that there is no fire in a lake. As in the case of the 'sapakṣa', the 'vipakṣa' refers to an individual member of a class.

When the existence of fire is proved by means of smoke, the latter, being a correct mark, is absent not only from the lake, but also from anything which lacks fire. Although a correct mark does not have to be present in all the *sapakṣa*, it does have to be absent from all the *vipakṣa*.

### 11. *The Example (Dṛṣṭānta)*

There are two kinds of examples according to whether they are given through similarity or through dissimilarity to the *pakṣa*.

When one infers the existence of the *sādhyā* by the existence of the mark, one must know by experience that wherever the mark exists the *sādhyā* exists. When one infers the existence of fire by the existence of smoke, for instance, one must know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The relation expressed by “Wherever the mark exists, the *sādhyā* exists” is called positive concomitance (*anvaya*). Any locus for which positive concomitance holds true can be given as an example. This kind of example is called an example through similarity. It is similar to the *pakṣa*, since both it and the *pakṣa* possess the *sādhyā* and the mark. An example through similarity is chosen from any *sapakṣa* that are at the same time loci of the mark. A red-hot ball, being a *sapakṣa* but not a locus of smoke, cannot be chosen as an example through similarity, for it has to be the locus of Property *p* and Property *q*.

The other kind of example is called ‘an example through dissimilarity’. Just as we know that wherever the mark exists, the *sādhyā* exists, we also know that wherever there is no *sādhyā*, there is no mark. The relation expressed by “Wherever there is no *sādhyā*, there is no mark” is called negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). A locus for which negative concomitance holds true can be given as the second kind of example. For instance, a lake, where there is neither fire nor smoke, can be given as an example of the second type. This type of example is dissimilar to the *pakṣa*, since the example possesses neither the *sādhyā* nor the mark while the *pakṣa* does. A *vipakṣa* can be given as an example through dissimilarity, for it lacks the *sādhyā*.

### 12. *Fallacious Means of Proof*

Fallacious means of proof are classified according to fallacies of the *pakṣa*, of the mark, and of the example. Our text enumerates nine sorts of

fallacious *pakṣa*, according as they are contradicted by perception, inference, etc.

A fallacious mark is one which does not possess all the three aspects of a correct mark. There are three kinds of fallacious marks: unrecognized (*asiddha*), which lack the first aspect of a correct mark; inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), which lack either the second aspect or the third aspect; and contradicted (*viruddha*), which lack both the second and the third aspects.

There are two kinds of fallacious examples: one is given through similarity; the other, through dissimilarity.

We have outlined the means of proof and its fallacies and, in the notes to the translation, will explain perception, inference, the means of refutation, and their various possible fallacies.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, H. O. S. 47, 1968, p.v.
- <sup>2</sup> *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (T) (Tokyo: 1924–1929), Vol. 44, p. 91.c.
- <sup>3</sup> Disputes arose among scholars as to who was the author of this text. Some scholars claimed that Dignāga was the author; some ascribed it to Śāṅkarasvāmin. Today, the latter view seems to be commonly accepted. This problem is dealt with in the articles below (listed in chronological order):  
S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1909 pp. 89–100.  
H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London 1917, p. 68.  
S. C. Vidyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1921, p. 300.  
M. I. Tobjanski, 'On the Authorship of Nyāyapraveśa', *Bulletin de L'Académie des Sciences de L'U.R.S.S.* (1926) 975–982.  
V. Bhattacharyya, 'The Nyāyapraveśa of Dinnāga', *Indian Historical Quarterly* 3 (1927) 132–160.  
N. D. Mironov, 'Dignāga's Nyāyapraveśa and Haribhadra's ṭīkā on it', *Festausgabe für Richard von Garbe*, 1927.  
H. Jacobi, 'Über das Alter der Mañimekhalai', *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik* 5, No. 3, Leipzig 1927. A. B. Keith, 'Authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa', *Indian Historical Quarterly* IV (1928) 14–22.  
G. Tucci, 'Is the Nyāyapraveśa by Dinnāga?', *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1928) 7–13.  
H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 5 (1929) 522–542.
- <sup>4</sup> *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti*, included in Gaekward Oriental Series (G.O.S.) No. 38.
- <sup>5</sup> *Yin ming ju cheng li lun* T. No. 1630, 32, 11–13.
- <sup>6</sup> *Yin ming ju cheng li lun shu* T. No. 1840, 44, 91–143.
- <sup>7</sup> Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, Reprint, ed. by D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo 1962, No. 5706, 130, 74–76; V. Bhattacharyya (ed.), *Nyāyapraveśa*, Part II, G.O.S. No. 39, Baroda 1927.

<sup>8</sup> Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, No. 5706; Tibetan tripitaka, Tohoku Catalogue, Sendai 1934, No. 4208.

<sup>9</sup> B. Dhruva (ed.), *The Nyāyapraveśaka*, Part I, Sanskrit text with Commentaries, G.O.S. No. 38, Baroda 1930.

<sup>10</sup> N. D. Mironov, *Nyāyapraveśa* I. Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed, *T'oung Pao* 28 (1931) 1–24.

<sup>11</sup> H. Ui, *Bukkyō Ronrigaku*, Tokyo 1944, pp. 363–376.

<sup>12</sup> An instance of the five-membered syllogism is given by:

(a) The statement of the *pakṣa*: The mountain possesses fire,

(b) The statement of the mark: because of smoke.

(c) The statement of positive concomitance: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a fireplace.

(d) Application: So in the case of that mountain.

(e) Conclusion: Therefore, the mountain possesses fire.

It is asserted by (e), not by (a), that the mountain possesses fire. In (d) positive concomitance between smoke and fire is shown to be true in the case of the mountain, too. When (d) and (e) are omitted from these five members, the three remaining members comprise a three-membered syllogism.

## TRANSLATION

### 1. Summary

Means of proof (*sādhana*) and means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) together with their fallacies (*ābhāsa*) are pertinent for [bringing] understanding to others.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) together with their fallacies are pertinent for one's own understanding.<sup>1</sup>

This is a summary of the doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

### 2. Means of Proof

Of these [two branches of our doctrine], the means of proof is the statement of the *pakṣa* and the other [members of a syllogism], because a matter unknown to questioners is transmitted by statements of the *pakṣa*, the mark (*hetu*), and the example (*drṣṭānta*).<sup>3</sup>

#### 2.1. The *Pakṣa* (The Subject Matter of Inference)

Of these, the *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer<sup>4</sup> wishes to prove to be qualified<sup>5</sup> by a recognized qualifier. It is tacitly

implied that no *pakṣa* is to be contradicted by perception, etc.<sup>6</sup> Thus, for instance: “Sound is permanent”, or “[Sound is] impermanent.”<sup>7</sup>

### 2.2. *The Mark*

The mark has three aspects. What are its three aspects? [They are] that it be a property of the *pakṣa*, that it be present in the *sapakṣa* [i.e., entities homogeneous with the *pakṣa*], and that it not be present in the *vipakṣa* [i.e., entities heterogeneous to the *pakṣa*].<sup>8</sup> What is the *sapakṣa* and what is the *vipakṣa*? The *sapakṣa* is [whatever is] similar to the *pakṣa* by the common possession of the *sādhya*, i.e., the property to be proved. For instance, when sound is to be proved impermanent,<sup>9</sup> a pot, which is impermanent, is a *sapakṣa*. The *vipakṣa* is that which lacks the inferable property. [Now] we know that whatever is permanent is unproduced, like space.<sup>10</sup> In this case, the property of being produced, or the property of ensuing upon human effort, is present<sup>11</sup> only in the *sapakṣa*, and never in the *vipakṣa*. Therefore, these are the marks for [proving something to be] impermanent.

### 2.3. *The Example*

There are two examples [according to whether they are given] through similarity or through dissimilarity. Of these, the example through similarity is that in which the mark is stated to be present only in the *sapakṣa*. For example, “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot.” The example through dissimilarity is that in which the mark is stated to be absent wherever the inferable property is absent. For instance, “whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like space.” By the word ‘permanent’ is here meant the absence of impermanence. Likewise, by the word ‘unproduced’ is meant the absence of produced-ness, just as the absence of the absence is presence. We have now explained the *pakṣa* [the mark, and the example].

### 2.4. *Statements of the Pakṣa, the Mark, and the Example*

Statements of these [factors, i.e., the *pakṣa*, the mark, and the example] are the means of proof when one would convince others. For instance, “Sound is impermanent” is a statement of the *pakṣa*. “Because it is produced”<sup>12</sup> is a statement of the property of the *pakṣa* [i.e., the mark]. “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc.” is a

statement of positive concomitance with the *sapakṣa*. “Whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like space” is a statement of negative concomitance. We say that these three [statements] make the members [of the syllogism], and no more.<sup>13</sup>

### 3.1. *Fallacious pakṣa*

A fallacious *pakṣa*<sup>14</sup> is one which the arguer wishes to prove but which is contradicted by perception or other factors. Thus:

- (1) a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by perception,
- (2) a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by inference,
- (3) a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by traditional doctrine,
- (4) a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by common knowledge,
- (5) a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by one’s own statement,
- (6) a *pakṣa* in which the qualifier is not admitted to exist,
- (7) a *pakṣa* in which the qualificand is not admitted to exist,
- (8) a *pakṣa* in which the qualifier and the qualificand are not admitted to exist, and
- (9) a *pakṣa* in which the relation [between the qualifier and the qualificand] is well established [and not in need of demonstration].

Of these,

(1) an instance of a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by perception is: “Words are inaudible.”<sup>15</sup>

(2) An instance of a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by inference is: “A pot is permanent.”<sup>16</sup>

(3) An instance of a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by traditional doctrine is seen when a *Vaiśeṣika* would prove that sound is permanent.<sup>17</sup>

(4) An instance of a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by common knowledge is: “A human skull is pure, because it is a part of a living being, like a conch or an oystershell.”<sup>18</sup>

(5) An instance of a *pakṣa* that is contradicted by one’s own statement is: “My mother was barren.”

(6) An instance of a *pakṣa* in which the qualifier is not admitted to exist is seen when a Buddhist says to a Sāṃkhya that sound is perishable.<sup>19</sup>

(7) An instance of a *pakṣa* in which the qualificand is not admitted to exist is seen when a Sāṃkhya says to a Buddhist that the soul is sentient.<sup>20</sup>

(8) An instance of a *pakṣa* in which the qualifier and the qualificand

are not admitted to exist is seen when a Vaiśeṣika says to a Buddhist that the soul is the inherent cause of happiness, etc.<sup>21</sup>

(9) An instance of a *pakṣa* in which the relation [between the qualifier and the qualificand] is well established [and not in need of demonstration] is: “Sound is audible.”

Statements of these nine<sup>22</sup> sorts are faults of the thesis (*pratijñā*)<sup>23</sup>, because they reject the property itself that one would prove [to exist in the *pakṣa*, as in the first five sorts], or because they cannot convince [the opponent, as in the next three sorts], or because the means of proof would be useless [as in the last sort]. We have now explained the fallacious *pakṣa*.

### 3.2. Fallacious marks

There are<sup>24</sup> [three kinds of] fallacious marks: unrecognized, inconclusive, and contradicted.<sup>25</sup>

3.2.1. UNRECOGNIZED MARKS. Of these [three fallacious marks], the unrecognized mark is of four varieties:

- (1) a mark that is unrecognized by both the proponent and the opponent,
- (2) a mark that is unrecognized by either the proponent or the opponent,
- (3) a mark that is unrecognized because its existence is in doubt, and
- (4) a mark that is unrecognized because its substratum is not admitted to exist.

Of these,

(1) an instance of a mark that is unrecognized by both the proponent and the opponent is as follows: one would prove that sound is permanent<sup>26</sup> and says, “because it is visible.”<sup>27</sup>

(2) An instance of a mark that is unrecognized by either the proponent or the opponent is as follows: one would prove that sound is permanent to a man who holds that sound has [only] manifestation and says, “because it is produced.”<sup>28</sup>

(3) An instance of a mark that is unrecognized because its existence is in doubt is as follows: one would prove [that a mountain has] fire and points [not to smoke but] to a mass of matter that may be suspected of being mist.<sup>29</sup>

(4) An instance of a mark that is unrecognized because its substratum is not admitted to exist is as follows: one would prove that space is a

substance to a man who denies the existence of space and says, “because it is a substratum of qualities.”<sup>30</sup>

3.2.2. INCONCLUSIVE MARKS. There are six varieties of inconclusive marks:

- (1) a mark common [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*],
- (2) a mark uncommon [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*],
- (3) a mark residing in some *sapakṣa* and in all the *vipakṣa*,
- (4) a mark residing in some *vipakṣa* and in all the *sapakṣa*,
- (5) a mark residing in both some *sapakṣa* and some *vipakṣa*, and
- (6) a mark that establishes [a set of] contradictory results.

Of these,

(1) an instance of a mark common [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*] is: “Sound is permanent, because it is an object of valid cognition.” This [mark] is inconclusive because the property of being an object of valid cognition is common to both permanent and impermanent things. [The question remains] whether sound is impermanent because it is an object of valid cognition, like a pot, or whether sound is permanent because it is an object of valid cognition, like space.<sup>31</sup>

(2) An instance of a mark uncommon [to both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*] is: “[Sound is]<sup>32</sup> permanent because it is audible”, for the mark [i.e., audibility] is a cause of doubt, because it is excluded from both permanent and impermanent things [other than sound], and because it is impossible that there should be anything that is neither permanent nor impermanent. [The question remains:] To what sort of things [– permanent or impermanent –] does the audibility of sound belong?<sup>33</sup>

(3) An instance of a mark residing in some *sapakṣa* and in all the *vipakṣa* is: “Sound does not ensue upon human effort, because it is impermanent.” [Here] the *pakṣa* is something that does not ensue upon human effort. Its *sapakṣa* consists of lightning, space, etc. Impermanence [i.e., the mark] resides in some *sapakṣa*, i.e., in lightning, etc., but not in space. The *pakṣa* is something that does not ensue upon human effort. Its *vipakṣa* consists of pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things as pots.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, this [mark] is also inconclusive, because it is a quality common to both lightning and pots. [The question remains:] Does sound ensue upon human effort because it is impermanent like a pot, or does sound not ensue upon human effort because it is impermanent like lightning, etc.?

(4) An instance of a mark residing in some *vipakṣa* and in all the *sapakṣa* is: “Sound ensues upon human effort, because it is impermanent.” [Here] the *pakṣa* is something that ensues upon human effort. Its *sapakṣa* consists of pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things as pots.<sup>35</sup> The *pakṣa* is something that ensues upon human effort. Its *vipakṣa* consists of lightning, space, etc. Here impermanence resides in some *vipakṣa*, namely, lightning, etc., but not in space, etc. Therefore, this mark is also inconclusive, as in the previous case, because it is a quality common to both lightning and pots.<sup>36</sup>

(5) An instance of a mark residing in both some *sapakṣa* and some *vipakṣa* is: “Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal.” [Here] the *pakṣa* is something permanent. Its *sapakṣa* consists of space, the atoms, etc. Incorporeality [i.e., the mark] resides in some *sapakṣa* such as space, etc., but not in other *sapakṣa*, such as atoms.<sup>37</sup> The *pakṣa* is something permanent. Its *vipakṣa* consists of pots, happiness, etc. Incorporeality<sup>38</sup> resides in some [*vipakṣa*], viz., in happiness, but not in pots, etc. Therefore, this mark is also inconclusive, because it is a property common to both happiness and space.

(6) An instance of a mark that establishes [a set of] contradictory results is: “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot;<sup>39</sup> sound is permanent, because it is audible, like ‘sound-ness’ (*śabdātva*).” As these two marks lead us to doubt, the two taken together constitute a single inconclusive mark.<sup>40</sup>

3.2.3. CONTRADICTED MARKS. There are four varieties of contradicted marks:

- (1) a mark that proves the opposite of the *sādhya* itself,
- (2) a mark that proves the opposite of some attribute of the *sādhya*,
- (3) a mark that proves the opposite of the property-possessor itself, and
- (4) a mark that proves the opposite of some attribute of the property-possessor.

Of these,

(1) an instance of a mark that proves the opposite of the *sādhya* itself is: “Sound is permanent, because it is produced, or because it ensues upon human effort.” This mark is contradicted, because it exists only in the *vipakṣa*.<sup>41</sup>

(2) An instance of a mark that proves the opposite of some attribute of the *sādhya* is: “The eyes and the other [senses] are for the sake of some

entity other than themselves, because they are aggregates, like the individual parts of a bed or a chair.” Just as this mark [‘aggregate-ness’] proves of the eyes their property of being for the sake of some other entity, so also it proves of the other entity, namely the soul, its property of being an aggregate, because the mark [‘aggregate-ness’]<sup>42</sup> definitely leads us to both [the conclusions].<sup>43</sup>

(3) An instance of a mark that proves the opposite of the property-possessor itself is: “Existence is neither a substance, nor an action, nor a quality<sup>44</sup>, because it possesses one substance [as its locus] and because it resides in qualities and actions, like lower universals.” Just as this mark proves that existence is not a substance, etc., so also it proves that existence is not existence,<sup>45</sup> because the mark [here employed] definitely leads us to both [the conclusions].<sup>46</sup>

(4) An instance of a mark that proves the opposite of some attribute of the property-possessor is given in the above [Vaiśeṣika’s opinion:] That mark has a given attribute, namely, the property of causing the notion “[it is] existent.” The same mark proves the opposite of this attribute, namely, the property of not causing the notion “[it is] existent,” because the mark [here employed] definitely leads us to both [the conclusion].<sup>47</sup>

### 3.3. *Fallacious examples*

There are two kinds<sup>48</sup> of fallacious examples [according to whether they are given] through similarity or through dissimilarity.

3.3.1. FALLACIOUS EXAMPLES THROUGH SIMILARITY. There are five varieties of fallacious examples through similarity:<sup>49</sup>

- (1) an example in which the mark is not found,
- (2) an example in which the *sādhya* is not found,
- (3) an example in which neither the mark nor the *sādhya* is found,<sup>50</sup>
- (4) an example that lacks [the statement of] positive concomitance, and
- (5) an example where positive concomitance is [expressed] in the reverse order.<sup>51</sup>

(1) An example in which the mark is not found is: “Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom.<sup>52</sup> Whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like an atom.” Here the *sādhya*, permanence, resides in an atom, but the mark, incorporeality, does not, because the atoms are corporeal.

(2) An example in which the *sādhya* is not found is:<sup>53</sup> “Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like the intellect. Whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like the intellect.” Here the mark, incorporeality, resides in the intellect, but the *sādhya*, permanence, does not, because the intellect is impermanent.

(3) There are two kinds of examples in which neither the mark nor the *sādhya* is found: existent examples and non-existent examples. In [the last syllogism if we substitute the example] “like a pot,” we have an existent example in which neither is found, because in a pot there are [both] impermanence and corporeality.<sup>54</sup> “Like space” is a non-existent example when one argues against a man who denies the existence of space.

(4) An example that lacks [the statement of] positive concomitance is one where the coexistence of the mark and the *sādhya* is<sup>55</sup> given with no [statement of] positive concomitance. Thus: “Impermanence and the property of being produced are seen to reside in a pot.”<sup>56</sup>

(5) An example where positive concomitance is [expressed] in the reverse order is: one says, “Whatever is impermanent is seen to be produced,” when he should say, “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent.”

3.3.2. FALLACIOUS EXAMPLES THROUGH DISSIMILARITY:<sup>57</sup> There are five<sup>58</sup> varieties of fallacious examples through dissimilarity:

- (1) an example from which the *sādhya* is not excluded,
- (2) an example from which the mark is not excluded,
- (3) an example from which neither the *sādhya* nor the mark is excluded,
- (4) an example that lacks [the statement of] negative concomitance, and
- (5) an example where negative concomitance is [expressed] in the reverse order.

Of these,

(1) an example from which the *sādhya* is not excluded is: “Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom.<sup>59</sup> Whatever is impermanent is seen to be corporeal, like an atom.” Here the mark, incorporeality, is excluded from an atom, for an atom is corporeal, but the *sādhya*, permanence, is not excluded, for an atom is permanent.<sup>60</sup>

(2) An example from which the mark is not excluded is: “[Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent is seen to be corporeal,] like an action.” Here the *sādhya*, permanence, is excluded from an action, for an action is impermanent; but the mark, incorporeality, is not excluded, for an action is incorporeal.<sup>61</sup>

(3) An example from which neither the *sādhya* nor the mark is excluded is: “[Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent is seen to be corporeal,] like space” as said to one who holds space to be existent. Here neither permanence nor incorporeality is excluded from space, because space is permanent and incorporeal.

(4) An example that lacks [the statement of] negative concomitance is one where the fact that the given example is a thing dissimilar to the *pakṣa* is shown without any expression of negative concomitance between the mark and the *sādhya*. Thus:<sup>62</sup> “Corporeality and impermanence are seen to reside in a pot.”<sup>63</sup>

(5) An example where negative concomitance is [expressed] in the reverse order is: one says, “Whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent,” when he should say, “Whatever is impermanent is corporeal.”<sup>64</sup>

### 3.4. *Fallacious means of proof*

Statements containing the above fallacious *pakṣa*, marks, and examples are fallacious means of proof.

## 4. *Perception and Inference*

On the other hand, for one’s own understanding the only valid means of cognition are these two: perception and inference.<sup>65</sup> Of these, perception is devoid of conceptual construction.<sup>66</sup> It is that kind of cognition which does not construct any [notion of] name, universal, etc., upon a sense-object such as color, etc. It is called perception (*pratyakṣa*) because it occurs to each (*prati*) sense (*akṣa*).<sup>67</sup> Inference is the understanding of an object through its mark. We have explained that a mark has three aspects. Accordingly, the cognition of an inferential object in the form “here is fire,” or “sound is impermanent,” is also called inference. In both cases [perception and inference] the cognition itself is the result, for the nature of cognition is comprehension of the object. They are called means of cognition because they appear to involve an activity.<sup>68</sup>

## 5. *Fallacious Perception and Fallacious Inference*

A cognition in the form of a mental construction of something other than the particular is a fallacious perception. The cognition ‘a pot’, ‘cloth’,

which arises in one who is building mental constructs, is fallacious perception because its object is not the particular.<sup>69</sup> Fallacious inference is a cognition based on a fallacious mark. We have explained many varieties of the fallacious marks. Accordingly, the cognition of an inferential object that arises in a person untrained [in these rules of inference] will be fallacious inference.

### 6. *Means of Refutation*

The means of refutation is that which points out faults in the means of proof [set forth by the opponent].<sup>70</sup> The means of proof is faulty when it lacks one of its members. The *pakṣa* is faulty when it is contradicted by perception, etc. The mark is faulty when it is unrecognized, inconclusive, or contradicted. The example is faulty when the mark or the *sādhya* is not found in it, etc. To point out such a fault, to make one's questioner recognize it, is refutation.

### 7. *Fallacious Means of Refutation*

Fallacious means of refutation is that which points out nonexistent faults in the means of proof. [E.g.:] stating that the means of proof is incomplete when it is complete; stating that the *pakṣa* is faulty when it is not faulty; stating that the mark is unrecognized when it is recognized; stating that the mark is inconclusive when it is conclusive; stating that the mark is contradicted when it is not contradicted; stating that there is the fault of faulty example when the example is faultless. These are fallacious means of refutation; for the opponent's viewpoint is not refuted by them because it is without fault.

At the outset [i.e., in this introduction] only the meanings of the terms have been explained, so as to show the general direction [that further research should take].

The arguments for and against them are examined elsewhere.

*Nyāyapraveśakasūtra*

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## NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

\* In the fall of 1967 I had a chance to read the *Nyāyapraveśa* under Professor M. Nagatomi at Harvard University. This translation is based upon the note at that time. Professor D. Ingalls at the same university kindly read my translation and gave me suggestions. Professor H. Kitagawa in Japan read carefully the whole manuscript and gave me invaluable suggestions by correspondence. Here I express my deepest gratitude to these three professors. And also I thank my friends Mr. R. Thurman and Miss P. Granoff, who rendered great help in improving my style.

<sup>1</sup> Dignāga classifies inference into two types: inference for one's own sake (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). The difference between these two can be illustrated by the following example. When one happens to see smoke rising from a mountain-side, he may infer in his mind that there is fire on the mountain. This type of inference, namely, the inference performed in one's own mind without accompanying communication to others is inference for one's own sake. If, however, someone should join him at this moment, and he should tell the newcomer that there is fire on the mountain, he would then express by statements the knowledge gained from the inference for his own sake. This type of expressed inference is called inference for the sake of others.

Śaṅkarasvāmin follows Dignāga's twofold classification of inference; in this text, however, he does not employ the words '*svārthānumāna*' and '*parārthānumāna*'. Instead, the two terms '*sādhana*' (means of proof) and '*dūṣaṇa*' (means of refutation) are employed for Dignāga's '*parārthānumāna*', and the word '*anumāna*', which means inference, is employed for Dignāga's '*svārthānumāna*'.

It seems that Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* (*NM*) was the model of the *Nyāyapraveśa* (*NP*), for *NP* not only follows the general pattern of *NM*, but also contains many passages almost identical with those of *NM*. As far as we can know from the Chinese translation of *NM* (T. 32, 1-6), the terms '*svārthānumāna*' and '*parārthānumāna*' are also not used in *NM*, although they frequently appear in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*).<sup>2</sup> According to the Chinese translation (*Ch*) and the Tibetan translation made from *Ch* (T-2) (*Tibetan Tripitaka* 130, 76, leaf 1, 1.8), this line should be "This is a summary of treatises," but I followed Haribhadra's commentary, *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* (*NPV*) (p. 12, 1.17.), and the Tibetan translation made from the Sanskrit text (T-1) (*Tibetan Tripitaka*, 130, 74, leaf 3, 1.3).

The verse in the text and the sentence “This is a summary of the doctrine” is quoted in the *Hetutattvopadeśa* (*HTU*) (p. 261.).

<sup>3</sup> The view that the statement of the *pakṣa* and the other members of the syllogism are the means of proof is found in *NM* (T. 32, 1a.) and the *Vādavidhi* (quoted in K’uei Chi’s commentary, *Yin ming ju cheng li lun shu* (*Yin*), T. 44, 94a.).

According to Dignāga’s *PS*, K’uei Chi, and Haribhadra, however, the statement of the *pakṣa* is not considered to be a part of the means of proof. (*PS*, 124, b, 5; *Yin*, T. 44, 93 a; *NPV*, p. 14, 1.6. Cf. Kitagawa, *Indokotenronrigaku no Kenkyū*, p. 127; Ui, *Indotetsugaku Kenkyū*, 5, 545.)

<sup>4</sup> Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu* (*NB*), 3.42: *svayam iti vādinā* (‘*Svayam*’ (oneself) means ‘by the arguer himself’.)

<sup>5</sup> Dhruva’s edition (D) has *prasiddhaviśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭatayā*; the text included in *NPV* (V) and Mironov’s edition (M) have *prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā*. I prefer the latter.

<sup>6</sup> This seems to be a later interpolation, because, if this is original, it would be difficult to explain why the author put the words “It is tacitly implied” (*iti vākyaśeṣaḥ*) right after the definition of the *pakṣa*. Though Haribhadra reads it as an original sentence, *Ch* and *T-2* have not translated it. H. Ui counted this as one of the reasons why the Chinese translation represents the form closest to the original. (Ui, *Tōyō no Ronri*, p. 220.)

Skt. *pratyakṣady-*(D) should be *pratyakṣādy-*(V, p. 16, 1.1.)

<sup>7</sup> *Ch* has “Sound is impermanent.”

These examples must often be understood as “Words are permanent” or “Words are impermanent.” The Sanskrit ‘*śabda*’ means both sound and word. The examples arose in the course of arguments concerning the eternity of the Veda. The ritualists (and later the Sāṃkhya) insisted that the words are always present, in unmanifested but potentially creative form, even when not pronounced, and that they become manifested under some circumstances. The Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists did not agree with them.

According to the definition given by Śāṅkarasvāmin, the *pakṣa* is an object which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by a property, not the statement of the form: A property-possessor is qualified by a property. The statements, however, are here taken as examples of the *pakṣa*, which seems to indicate some laxity in the usage of the term ‘*pakṣa*’.

<sup>8</sup> Skt. *sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe cāsattvaṃ iti* (D); ... *cāsattvaṃ eva* (M and V). Dharmakīrti in the seventh century maintained that the meanings of the second and the third aspects of a correct mark are the same. He employed the word 'eva' right after 'sapakṣa' in the definition of the second aspect, and intended to mean 'only' by 'eva'. (NB, 3. 122; *he'oḥ sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ...*) According to him, therefore, the second aspect is: The mark must be present only (*eva*) in the *sapakṣa*. In this case, the second aspect implies the third aspect, which is: The mark must be absent from all the *vipakṣa*; and the third aspect implies the second aspect. He allowed inferences with the first aspect and either the second or the third aspect.

<sup>9</sup> Skt. *anitye śabde sādhye*. Since this phrase is a locative absolute, it may be translated somewhat more literally by "When impermanent sound is what is to be proved (*sādhyā*), ..." Here '*sādhyā*' is used in the sense of the *pakṣa*.

<sup>10</sup> *Ch* has "like space, etc."

<sup>11</sup> *Ch* has "... upon human effort, which is the property of the *pakṣa*, is present ..."

<sup>12</sup> Lit., "Because of its 'produced-ness' or its property of being produced"

<sup>13</sup> This means that five members are not needed for the sake of inference. As for the five-membered syllogism, see Note 12 to the introduction.

<sup>14</sup> In this system, the validity of the *pakṣa* is independent of the mark and the example.

<sup>15</sup> Since we can know by perception that words are audible (or there is audibility in words), the statement "Words are inaudible" is contradicted by perception.

Against this Buddhist view some later thinkers such as Uddyotakara and Kumārila raised the question whether audibility can be grasped by perception. Uddyotakara argues as follows: "He (Dignāga) knows neither the object of perception nor the object of inference. Why? Because sense-organs cannot grasp the function of sense-organs, and audibility concerns the function of a sense-organ. How can we know then that audibility is perceived through a sense-organ?" (*Nyāyavārttika* (NV), p. 41, 1.1: *tais tu na pratyakṣasya viśayo jñāto nānumānasya viśaya iti. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ? indriyavṛttinām atīndriyatvāt, śrāvaṇatvaṃ cendriyavṛttili. sā katham pratyakṣā bhavati.*) Kumārila says: "Audibility is not cognized by perception; it is cognized through positive concomitance and negative concomitance as in the case of the deaf, etc. (*Ślokavārttika* (ŚV), 8, v. 60, b. 61, a:

*na hi śrāvaṇatā nāma pratyakṣeṇā 'vagamyate sā 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṁ gamyate badhirādiṣu).*

<sup>16</sup> Since we can prove by correct inference that a pot possesses impermanence, the statement "A pot is permanent" is contradicted by inference.

<sup>17</sup> According to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, sound is impermanent. Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS)* 2.2. 31–37; *Prasastapādabhāṣya (PBh)*, p. 287.

<sup>18</sup> The Kāpālikas, followers of a particular Śaiva sect, carried human skulls which they used as receptacles for their food. To prove the purity of the human skull, they set forth this syllogism. Here only the part "A human skull is pure" is relevant. For some philosophers the statement "A human skull is pure" may be an instance of the *pakṣa* contradicted by traditional doctrine as has been quoted in *NV* (p. 41, 1.3). For others, however, it can be an instance of the *pakṣa* contradicted by common sense.

*Ch* has "like a conch" instead of "like a conch or an oystershell." In addition to this instance of the fallacious *pakṣa*, *Ch* gives a second one, viz., "Hare-possessor is not the moon." (懷兔非月). Since the mark a hare appears on the surface of the moon, "hare-possessor" is used in Sanskrit as another name of the moon. Therefore, the statement "Hare-possessor is not the moon" is contradicted by common sense.

<sup>19</sup> According to the Sāṃkhya, nothing perishes. In place of origination and destruction, they speak of manifestation and disappearance. Therefore, the property of being perishable, the qualifier here, is not admitted by the Sāṃkhyas. The Buddhists, however, maintain that everything is perishable.

<sup>20</sup> The Sāṃkhyas accept the existence of the soul, the qualificand, while the Buddhists deny it.

<sup>21</sup> Inherence (*samavāya*) is the relation between things inseparably, connected, of which one is the container and the other the contained. That is to say, inherence is the cause of the notion "this is in that." (*PBh*, p. 324.) For instance, qualities and actions are inherent in a substance; the color red, in fire. That which has things inhering in it is called an inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*). The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the soul is the inherent cause of happiness, etc. (*PBh*, p. 70). The Buddhists, however, deny the category of inherence, and accordingly, the existence of the inherent cause. That the Buddhists deny the existence of the soul was mentioned in note 20.

*Ch* omits “of happiness, etc.”

<sup>22</sup> In *NM* and *PS* Dignāga enumerates just the first five of the nine sorts of fallacious *pakṣa*.

<sup>23</sup> It is to be noted that the author uses the Nyāya term ‘*pratijñā*’ for the first member of the syllogism in place of the Buddhist term ‘*pakṣavacana*’.

<sup>24</sup> Here *Ch* has, “We shall now explain fallacious marks.”

<sup>25</sup> In this text the author does not mention Dignāga’s *Hetucakra* (the table of nine possible varieties of correct and incorrect marks.)

<sup>26</sup> Skt. *śabdānityatve sādhye*. A literal translation is: “When impermanence of sound is *what is to be proved (sādhyā)*,...” The term ‘*sādhyā*’ here is used in the sense of the *pakṣa*’s being qualified by the *sādhyā*. Cf. Note 9.

<sup>27</sup> It has been said that an unrecognized mark is that which lacks the first aspect of a correct mark. (Intr. 12). In this case, the mark, visibility, is not present in the *pakṣa*, sound. That is to say, it lacks the first aspect.

<sup>28</sup> The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the words are permanent and not produced, but only become manifested under some circumstances. Cf. Note 7 to the translation.

<sup>29</sup> In *Ch* and T-2 (*Tibetan Tripitaka*, 130, 76, leaf 5, 1.7.) “a mass of matter” is a modifier of ‘fire’ as follows: “Some entity suspected to be mist or something else, is given to prove [the existence of] fire which is an aggregate of elements.”

(於霧等性起疑惑時，為成文種和合火有，而有所說。) The Sanskrit text on which the Chinese translator worked might have read “*bhūtasamghātāgnisiddhau*” instead of the present reading “*bhūtasamghāto ’gnisiddhau*.” T-1 has the same meaning as the Sanskrit text has here. (*Tibetan Tripitaka*, 130, 74, leaf 5, 1.7.)

<sup>30</sup> Here ‘substratum’ refers to the *pakṣa*, space. Since the mark must rest upon the *pakṣa*, qualities must rest upon space. (Note that the expression “because it is a substratum of qualities” (literal translation: because of [its] property of being a substratum of qualities) is logically the same as the expression “because of [its] qualities.”) However, when the substratum space is not admitted to exist, no qualities can rest upon it. Therefore, such a mark is considered to be unrecognized.

<sup>31</sup> An inconclusive mark lacks either the second or the third aspect of a correct mark. The mark here possesses the second aspect and lacks the third one.

<sup>32</sup> *Ch* has “Sound is.”

<sup>33</sup> Audibility, the mark here, resides only in sound, the *pakṣa* here, for there is nothing audible except sound. (The Vaiśeṣikas, however, consider ‘sound-ness’ (*śabdātva*) to be audible besides sound. See note 40.) Both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* must be different from the *pakṣa*. Therefore, the mark is present neither in the *sapakṣa* nor in the *vipakṣa*. It thus possesses the third aspect, but not the second one.

<sup>34</sup> *Ch* omits “as pots.”

<sup>35</sup> *Ch* omits “as pots.”

<sup>36</sup> *Ch* omits “because it is ... pot.”

<sup>37</sup> *Ch* has “the atoms, etc.”

<sup>38</sup> *Ch* omits “incorporeality.”

<sup>39</sup> *Ch* has “like a pot, etc.”

<sup>40</sup> The Vaiśeṣikas admit the existence of permanent universal which resides in each individual. For example, they hold that the universal ‘sound-ness’ resides in every individual sound. According to them, if a thing is cognized through a sense-organ, the universal of that thing can also be cognized through that same sense-organ. Sound is cognized through the ear. Therefore, soundness or sound-universal can also be perceived through the ear. Thus, in the case of the Vaiśeṣikas, the mark, audibility, is correct in the second syllogism: Audibility is a property of sound, and is present in the *sapakṣa* such as sound-ness, and not present in the *vipakṣa* at all. One can easily see that the mark, the property of being produced, is correct in the first syllogism. Each mark taken singly is thus correct insofar as it possesses the three aspects of a correct mark.

The combination of these two marks, however, furnishes occasion for a fault. That is to say, it leads to a set of contradictory results – Sound is permanent and impermanent. Dharmakīrti does not consider this to be a logical fallacy because it cannot occur in the process of natural inference. (*NB*, 3.111.)

<sup>41</sup> A contradicted mark is that which lacks both the second and the third aspects of a correct mark. That is to say, a contradicted mark exists only in the *vipakṣa*. Here the mark is the property of being produced or the property of ensuing upon human effort. Here the *sapakṣa* is anything permanent; the *vipakṣa* is anything impermanent. Whatever is produced or ensues upon human effort is impermanent. Therefore, the mark is seen only in the *vipakṣa*.

<sup>42</sup> *Ch* has "...so also it proves the opposite of some attribute of the *sādhya*, i.e., the property of being used by other aggregates, because a bed, etc., is used by other aggregates." (如是亦能成立與所立法差別相違積聚他用, 諸臥具等積聚他所受用故。)

<sup>43</sup> The Sāṃkhyas set forth this syllogism to prove the existence of the soul. (Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, v. 17.) They argue as follows: A bed and a chair are aggregates, hence they serve some entity other than themselves. Likewise, the eyes and the other sense-organs serve some entity other than themselves, because they are aggregates. That which the eyes, etc., serve is nothing but the soul. Therefore, the soul exists.

Here the *sādhya* is the property of being for some entity other than itself, and the mark is 'aggregate-ness'. The Sāṃkhyas consider the mark to possess the following three aspects: It exists in the *pakṣa*, the eyes, etc.; it is present in *sapakṣa*, such as a bed or a chair; and it is not present in any *vipakṣa*, i.e., anything that is not for some entity other than itself.

The author criticizes this Sāṃkhya's view as follows: A bed and a chair are aggregates and serve some entity other than themselves. However, that which they serve is our body, which is again an aggregate. Therefore, when the existence of the soul is to be proved by 'aggregate-ness' of the eyes, etc., the soul is proved at the same time to be an aggregate. According to the Sāṃkhya doctrine, however, the soul must be single, namely, not an aggregate. The property of the soul's being single is some attribute of the *sādhya* here. Therefore, the 'aggregate-ness' of the soul is the opposite of the above-mentioned attribute of the *sādhya*. The mark thus proves the opposite of some attribute of the *sādhya*.

Dignāga points out that the mark in this syllogism is expected to prove two matters at the same time. The first is that the eyes and the other sense-organs are for the sake of some entity other than themselves; the second is that the entity should be single. The cause of the difficulty explained above is that the second matter finds no mention in the statement of the *pakṣa* of this syllogism. These two matters should have been stated explicitly in the statement as follows: The eyes and the other [sense-organs] are for the sake of some single entity other than themselves. Now one can see that the mark, 'aggregate-ness', is present only in the *vipakṣa*. Therefore, it is said to be contradicted. (Kitagawa, *Indokotenronrigaku no Kenkyū*, pp. 191–192; *Tibetan Tripitaka* 130, 52, leaf 1, 1.4–5).

<sup>44</sup> *Ch* has "neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action."

<sup>45</sup> Skt. *dravyādīpratiśedham bhāvasya sādhayati* (D). V omits *bhāvasya*.

<sup>46</sup> According to the Vaiśeṣika, there are six categories: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), ultimate distinction (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). Some Vaiśeṣika philosophers count non-existence (*abhāva*) as the seventh category. The first category, *dravya*, is ninefold: earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, soul, and mind. The first four substances are in the form of an atom or an aggregate of atoms. *Sāmānya* is of two kinds: highest (*para*) and lower (*apara*). The former is existence (*bhāva*); the latter consists of 'substance-ness', 'quality-ness', 'action-ness', etc.

Substances such as an atom, space, time, direction, soul, and mind can be regarded as having no constituent substance. They are called the '*adravyam dravyam*' (the substance which possesses no substance). There is a second kind of substances, namely, those which have as their constituents more than two atoms, such as a body, a desk, etc. They are called the '*anekadravyam dravyam*' (the substance which possesses many or more than two substances). There are only these two kinds of substances.

Existence resides in any kind of substance quality, and action. Now, when existence resides in a substance, one can consider existence to possess the substance as its property-possessor. Disregarding the difference between the above two kinds of substances and regarding any substance as one substance (*ekadravya*), the Vaiśeṣikas represent existence as a possessor of one substance (*ekadravyavat*). According to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, every substance must possess either 'many substances' or 'no substance'. Existence, however, possesses one substance as its locus. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that existence is not a substance.

Existence is not a quality, either. According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, existence resides in qualities, but no quality can reside in another quality. Likewise, existence is not an action, for it resides in actions.

The author points out a difficulty in this Vaiśeṣika view. Indeed the mark (the property of possessing one substance) proves that existence is not a substance, but it also proves that existence is not existence. That is to say, a Vaiśeṣika is forced to accept the following syllogism: Existence is not existence, because it possesses one substance, like 'substance-ness'. Here the *pakṣa*, viz., the property-possessor, is existence. The mark is the property of having one substance. The statement of the example is "Whatever possesses the property of having one substance is not exist-

ence, like 'substance-ness'.<sup>47</sup> the mark here proves the opposite of the property-possessor itself.

In a similar way the author points out difficulties of the other marks (the property of residing in qualities and the property of residing in actions). These marks prove that existence is neither a quality nor an action, but they also prove that existence is not existence. As in the previous case, a Vaiśeṣika is forced to accept the following syllogisms:

Existence is not existence, because it resides in qualities. Whatever possesses the property of residing in qualities possesses the property of not being existence, like 'quality-ness'.

Existence is not existence, because it resides in actions. Whatever possesses the property of residing in actions possesses the property of not being existence, like 'action-ness'.

<sup>47</sup> The Vaiśeṣikas consider existence as the cause of the notion "[it is] existent." That is to say, they consider existence as possessing *satpratya-yakarṭṛtva* (the property of causing the notion "[it is] existent.") Indeed the mark discussed in note 46 proves that existence is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action, but it also proves that existence possesses *asatpratya-yakarṭṛtva* (the property of not causing the notion "[it is] existent.") Now, the following syllogism becomes correct: Existence possesses the property of not causing the notion "[it is] existent," because it possesses one substance, (or it resides in qualities or actions,) like 'substance-ness', ('quality-ness', or 'action-ness'.)

The lower universal such as 'substance-ness', 'quality-ness', or 'action-ness' causes the notion "[it is] a substance," "[it is] a quality," or "[it is] an action." But none of these lower universals causes the notion "[it is] existent."

*Asatpratya-yakarṭṛtva* is the opposite of 'some attribute of the property-possessor', viz., *satpratya-yakarṭṛtva*. The mark thus proves the opposite of some attribute of the property-possessor, insofar as it proves that existence possesses *asatpratya-yakarṭṛtva*.

<sup>48</sup> Here *Ch* has "We shall now explain fallacious examples."

<sup>49</sup> Among these five fallacious examples, the first three are property-possessors and the last two are statements.

<sup>50</sup> A correct example through similarity must be a locus of the mark and the *sādhyā*. If the locus lacks either or both of these two factors, it cannot be a correct example.

51 *Ch* has the names of the five fallacious examples through dissimilarity right after those of the fallacious examples through similarity.

52 *Ch* omits “like an atom.”

53 *Ch* has only “like the intellect.”

54 *Ch* omits this passage.

55 *Ch* has “... the *sādhya* in a pot, etc., is given...”

56 This example is fallacious because it lacks the statement “Where there is impermanence, there is produced-ness.”

57 Cf. Note 51.

58 The first three are property-possessors, and the last two are statements.

59 *Ch* omits this example.

60 *Ch* has “The reason is as follows: The *sādhya*, i.e., permanence, is not excluded from an atom, for they say that an atom is permanent. [But] the mark, incorporeality, is not seen [there].” (由於極微所成立法常性不遣，彼立極微是常性故，能成立法無質礙無。)

61 *Ch* has “Only the *sādhya* is excluded, [but] the probans is not; for they say that actions are incorporeal.” (但遣所立不遣能立，彼說諸業無質礙故。)

62 *Ch* omits this.

63 This fallacious example lacks the statement “Whatever there is no permanence, there is no incorporeality.”

64 *Ch* omits “when he should say... corporeal.”

65 The Naiyāyikas accepted four means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), canonical authority (*śabda*), and analogy (*upamāna*). The process of application of the last one may be illustrated as follows: Someone is told that a bison is like a cow. Going to a forest, he sees an animal like a cow and thinks that this animal must be the one called a bison.

In the system of our text, however, only two means of knowledge, i.e., perception and inference, are accepted.

66 When a cognition is devoid of conceptual construction and has as its object the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) that cognition is called a perception. If someone, looking at fire, has the cognition “here is fire” or ‘fire’, the Naiyāyikas consider this cognition to be a perception. But our author considers it to be an inference, since the cognition “here is fire” or ‘fire’ has been described by concepts or words.

<sup>67</sup> Perception occurs to each sense-organ: the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, etc.

<sup>68</sup> Vātsyāyana, Kumārila, and others clearly distinguish four factors of cognitions – namely, the result of cognition (*pramiti*)’ the means of cognition or knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the object of cognition (*prameya*), and the agent of cognition (*pramātr*). When one has the cognition “fire”, the cognition in the form “fire” is the result of cognition, the eyes are the means of cognition. Fire is the object and the person is the agent.

Here in our text, however, the first factor is identified with the second. It seems that he inherited this idea from Dignāga, who had said in *PS* as follows: “[we call the cognition itself] ‘*pramāṇa*’ [literally, a means of cognizing], ... although primarily it is a result ... or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (*svasaṃvitti*) is here the result [of the act of cognizing] – (Hattori, p. 28.)

<sup>69</sup> Skt. *-svalakṣaṇaviśaya*-(D) should be *-svalakṣaṇāviśaya*-(V p. 36, 1.23.)

<sup>70</sup> Dignāga enumerates fourteen varieties of fallacious means of refutation in *NM* and *PS* while Śāṅkarasvāmin avoids any description of them in this text.

#### TEXT

The following text is based upon the G.O.S. edition (D).

1. sādhanam dūṣaṇam caiva sābhāsam parasamvide/pratyakṣam anu-  
mānam ca sābhāsam tv ātmasamvide// iti śāstrārthasamgrahaḥ//

2. tatra pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam/ pakṣahetudrṣṭāntavacanair hi  
prāśnikānām apratīto’rthaḥ pratipādyata iti//

2.1 tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā  
svayaṁ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ/ pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyaśeṣaḥ/ tadya-  
thā/nityaḥ śabda ’nityo veti//

2.2 hetuḥ trirūpaḥ/kiṁ punas trairūpyam/ pakṣadharmatvaṁ sapakṣe  
sattvaṁ vipakṣe cāsattvaṁ iti// kaḥ punaḥ sapakṣaḥ/ ko vā vipakṣa iti//  
sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno ’rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ/ tadyathā/ anitye śabde  
sādhye ghaṭādir anityaḥ sapakṣaḥ// vipakṣo yatra sādhyam nāsti/ yan  
nityam tad akṛtakam drṣṭam yathākāśam iti/ tatra kṛtakatvaṁ prayat-  
nanantariyakatvaṁ vā sapakṣa evāsti vipakṣe nāsty eva/ ity anityādu  
hetuḥ//

2.3 drṣṭānto dvividhaḥ/ sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca// tatra sādhar-  
myeṇa tāvat/ yatra hetoḥ sapakṣa evāstitvaṁ khyāpyate/ tadyathā/ yat

kṛtakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādir iti// vaidharmyeṇāpi/ yatra sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva kathyate/ tadyathā/ yan nityam tad akṛtakam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam iti/ nityaśabdenātrānityatvasyābhāva ucyate/ akṛtakaśabdenāpi kṛtakatvasyābhāvaḥ/ yathā bhāvābhāvo 'bhāva iti// uktāḥ pakṣādayaḥ//

2.4. eṣāṃ vacanāni parapratyāyanakāle sādhanam/ tadyathā/ anityaḥ śabda iti pakṣavacanam/ kṛtakatvāditi pakṣadharmavacanam/ yat kṛtakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādir iti sapakṣānugamavacanam/ yan nityam tad akṛtakam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam iti vyatirekavacanam// etāny eva trayo'vayavā ity ucyante//

3.1 sādhayitum iṣṭo'pi pratyakṣādiviruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ/ tadyathā/ (1) pratyakṣaviruddhaḥ, (2) anumānaviruddhaḥ, (3) āgamaviruddhaḥ, (4) lokaviruddhaḥ, (5) svavacanaviruddhaḥ, (6) aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ, (7) aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ, (8) aprasiddhobhayaḥ, (9) prasiddhasaṃbandhaś ceti// tatra

(1) pratyakṣaviruddho yathā/ aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti//

(2) anumānaviruddho yathā/ nityo ghaṭa iti//

(3) āgamaviruddho yathā/ vaiśeṣikasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ//

(4) lokaviruddho yathā/ śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prānyaṅgatvāc chankhaśuktivad iti//

(5) svavacanaviruddho yathā/ mātā me vandhyeti//

(6) aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇo yathā/ bauddhasya sāmkyam prati vināśi śabda iti//

(7) aprasiddhaviśeṣyo yathā/ sāmkyasya bauddham prati cetana ātmeti//

(8) aprasiddhobhayo yathā/ vaiśeṣikasya bauddham prati sukhādisa-mavāyikāraṇam ātmeti//

(9) prasiddhasaṃbandho yathā/ śrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti// eṣāṃ vacanāni dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇamukhena pratipādanāsaṃbhavataḥ sādhanavaiphalyataś ceti pratijñādoṣāḥ// uktāḥ pakṣābhāsāḥ//

3.2. asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ//

3.2.1. tatrāsiddhaś catuḥprakāraḥ/ tadyathā/ (1) ubhayāsiddhaḥ, (2) anyatarāsiddhaḥ, (3) saṃdigdhāsiddhaḥ, (4) āśrayāsiddhaś ceti// tatra

(1) śabdānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ//

(2) kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyaktivādinam praty anyatarāsiddhaḥ//

(3) bāṣpādibhāvena saṃdhiyamāno bhūtasamghāto 'gnisiddhāv upa-diśyamānaḥ saṃdigdhāsiddhaḥ//

(4) dravyam ākāśam guṇāśrayatvād ity ākāśasattvavādinam praty āśrayāsiddhaḥ//

3.2.2. anaikāntikaḥ śatprakāraḥ/ (1) sādharmaṇaḥ, (2) asādharmaṇaḥ, (3) sapakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpī, (4) vipakṣaikadeśavṛttih sapakṣavyāpī, (5) ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛttih, (6) viruddhāvvyabhicārī ceti// tatra

(1) sādharmaṇaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvān nitya iti/ tad dhi nityānityapakṣayoḥ sādharmaṇatvād anaikāntikam/kiṁ ghaṭavat prameyatvād anityaḥ śabda āhosvid ākāśavat prameyatvān nitya iti//

(2) asādharmaṇaḥ śrāvaṇatvān nitya iti/ tad dhi nityānityapakṣābhyāṁ vyāvṛttatvān nityānityavinirmuktasya cānyasyāsaṁbhavāt saṁśayahe-  
tuḥ/ kiṁbhūtasāyasya śrāvaṇatvam iti//

(3) sapakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpī yathā/aprayatnānantariyakaḥ śabdo 'nityatvāt/ aprayatnānantariyakaḥ pakṣaḥ/ asya vidyudākāśādiḥ sa-  
pakṣaḥ/ tatraikadeśe vidyudātau vidyate 'nityatvam nākāśātau/ aprayat-  
nānantariyakaḥ pakṣaḥ/ asya ghaṭādir vipakṣaḥ/ tatra sarvatra ghaṭātau  
vidyate'nityatvam/ tasmād etad api vidyudghaṭasādharṁyeṇānaikānti-  
kam/ kiṁ ghaṭavad anityatvāt prayatnānantariyakaḥ śabdaḥ āhosvid  
vidyudādivad anityatvād aprayatnānantariyaka iti//

(4) vipakṣaikadeśavṛttih sapakṣavyāpī yathā/ prayatnānantariyakaḥ  
śabdo'nityatvāt/ prayatnānantariyakaḥ pakṣaḥ/ asya ghaṭādiḥ sapakṣaḥ/  
tatra sarvatra ghaṭātau vidyate 'nityatvam/ prayatnānantariyakaḥ pakṣaḥ/  
asya vidyudākāśādir vipakṣaḥ/ tatraikadeśe vidyudātau vidyate 'nityat-  
vam nākāśātau/ tasmād etad api vidyudghaṭasādharṁyeṇa pūrvavad  
anaikāntikam//

(5) ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā/ nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvād iti/  
nityaḥ pakṣaḥ/ asyākāśaparamāṇvādiḥ sapakṣaḥ/ tatraikadeśa ākāśātau  
vidyate 'mūrtatvam na paramāṇau/ nityaḥ pakṣaḥ/ asya ghaṭasukhādir  
vipakṣaḥ/ tatraikadeśe sukhātau vidyate 'mūrtatvam na ghaṭātau/  
tasmād etad api sukhākāśasādharṁyeṇānaikāntikam//

(6) viruddhāvvyabhicārī yathā/ anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad/  
nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti/ ubhayoḥ saṁśaya hetutvād  
dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ samuditāv eva//

3.2.3. viruddhaś catuḥprakāraḥ/ tadyathā/ (1) dharmasvarūpaviparī-  
tasādhanaḥ, (2) dharmaviśeṣaviparītaḥ ādhanaḥ, (3) dharmisvarūpavi-  
parītasādhanaḥ, (4) dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhanaś ceti// tatra

(1) dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanō yathā/ nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt  
prayatnānantariyakatvād veti/ ayaṁ hetur vipakṣa eva bhāvād viruddhaḥ//

(2) dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhano yathā/ parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṁghātavāc chayanāsanādyaṅgaviśeṣavad iti/ ayam hetur yathā pārārthyam cakṣurādīnām sādhayati tathā saṁhatatvam api parasyātmanaḥ sādhayati/ ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt//

(3) dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhano yathā/ na dravyam na karma na guṇo bhāvaḥ ekadravyavattvād guṇakarmasu ca bhāvāt sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti/ ayam hi hetur yathā dravyādipratīṣedham bhāvasya sādhayati tathā bhāvasyābhāvavattvam api sādhayati/ ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt//

(4) dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhano yathā/ ayam eva hetur asminn eva pūrvapakṣe 'syaiva dharmiṇo yo viśeṣaḥ satpratyaayakarṭṛtvam nāma tadviparītam asatpratyaayakarṭṛtvam api sādhayati/ ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt//

3.3. dṛṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ/ sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca// tatra

3.3.1. sādharmyeṇa tāvad dṛṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ/ tadyathā/ (1) sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ, (2) sādhyadharmāsiddhaḥ, (3) ubhayadharmāsiddhaḥ, (4) ananvayaḥ, (5) viparītānvayaś ceti// tatra

(1) sādhanadharmāsiddho yathā/ nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt paramāṇuvāt/ yad amūrtaṁ tan nityam dṛṣṭam yathā paramāṇuḥ/ paramāṇau hi sādhyam nityatvam asti sādhanadharmo 'mūrtatvam nāsti mūrtatvāt paramāṇūnām iti//

(2) sādhyadharmāsiddho yathā/ nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvād buddhivat/ yad amūrtaṁ tan nityam dṛṣṭam yathā buddhiḥ// buddhau hi sādhanadharmo 'mūrtatvam asti sādhyadharmo nityatvam nāsti/ anityatvād buddher iti//

(3) ubhayāsiddho dvividhaḥ/ sann asaṁś ceti/ tatra ghaṭavad iti vidyamānobhayāsiddhaḥ/ anityatvān mūrtatvāc ca ghaṭasya/ ākāśavad ityavidyamānobhayāsiddhaḥ/ tadasattvavādinām prati//

(4) ananvayo yatra vinānvayena sādhyasādhanaayoḥ sahabhāvaḥ pradarśyate/ yathā ghaṭe kṛtakatvam anityatvam ca dṛṣṭam iti//

(5) viparītānvayo yathā/ yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam dṛṣṭam iti vaktavye yad anityam tat kṛtakaṁ dṛṣṭam iti bravīti//

3.3.2. vaidharmyeṇāpi dṛṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ/ tadyathā/ (1) sādhyāvvyāvṛttaḥ, (2) sādhanāvvyāvṛttaḥ, (3) ubhayāvvyāvṛttaḥ, (4) avyati-rekaḥ, (5) viparītavyatirekaś ceti// tatra

(1) sādhyāvvyāvṛtto yathā/ nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt paramāṇuvāt/ yad anityam tan mūrtaṁ dṛṣṭam yathā paramāṇuḥ/ paramāṇor hi sādhanadharmo 'mūrtatvam vyāvṛttaṁ mūrtatvāt paramāṇūnām iti/ sādhyadharmo nityatvam na vyāvṛttaṁ nityatvāt paramāṇūnām iti//

(2) sādhanāvyaṅgī yathā/ karmavad iti/ karmaṇaḥ sādhyam nityatvam vyāvṛttam/ anityatvāt karmaṇaḥ/ sādhanadharmo 'mūrtatvam na vyāvṛttam/ amūrtatvāt karmaṇaḥ//

(3) ubhayāvyaṅgī/ ākāśavad iti/ tatsattvavādinam prati/ tato nityatvam amūrtatvam ca na vyāvṛttam/ nityatvād amūrtatvāc cākāśasyeti//

(4) avyatiṅko yatra vinā sādhyasādhanavivṛtī tadvipakṣabhāvo nidarśyate/ yathā ghaṭe mūrtatvam anityatvam ca dṛṣṭam iti//

(5) viparītavyatireko yathā/ yad anityam tan mūrtaṁ dṛṣṭam iti vaktavye yan mūrtaṁ tad anityam dṛṣṭam iti bravīti//

3.4. eṣāṁ pakṣaheturdṛṣṭāntābhāsānāṁ vacanāni sādhanābhāsam//

4. ātmapratyāyanārtham tu pratyakṣam anumānam ca dve eva pramāṇe// tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau nāmajātyādikalpanārahitaṁ tat/ akṣam akṣam prati vartata iti pratyakṣam// anumānam liṅgād arthadarśanam/ liṅgam punas trirūpam uktam/ tasmād yad anumeye 'rthe jñānam utpadyate 'gnir atrānityaḥ śabda iti vā tad anumānam// ubhayatra tad eva jñānam phalam adhigamarūpavāt/ savyāpāravatkyāteḥ pramāṇatvam iti//

5. kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣābhāsam/ yaj jñānam ghaṭaḥ paṭa iti vā vikalpayataḥ samutpadyate tad arthasvalakṣaṇāviśayatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam// hetvābhāsapūrvakam jñānam anumānābhāsam/ hetvābhāso hi bahuprakāra uktaḥ/ tasmād yad anumeye'rthe jñānam avyutpannasya bhavati tad anumānābhāsam//

6. sādhanadoṣodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni// sādhanadoṣo nyūnatvam/ pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam/ hetudoṣo'siddhānaikāntikaviruddhatvam/ dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ sādhanadharmādyasiddhatvam/ tasyodbhāvanam prāśnikapratyāyanam dūṣaṇam//

7. abhūtasādhanadoṣodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni// saṁpūrṇe sādhanānyūnatvavacanam/ aduṣṭapakṣe pakṣadoṣavacanam/ siddhahetuke 'siddhahetukam vacanam/ ekāntahetuke 'nekāntahetukam vacanam/ aviruddhahetuke viruddhahetukam vacanam/ aduṣṭadṛṣṭānte duṣṭadṛṣṭāntadoṣavacanam/ etāni dūṣaṇābhāsāni/na hy ebhiḥ parapakṣo dūṣyate/ niravadyatvāt tasya// ity uparamyate//

padārthamātram ākhyātam ādau dīnṁ mātrasiddhaye/ yātra yuktir ayuktir vā śanyatra suvicāritā// //iti nyāyapraveśakasūtram samāptam//

#### ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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- Ch: Nyāyapraveśa*, Chinese version, *Yin ming ju cheng li lun*. T. No. 1630, 32, 11–13.  
**D:** The text of the *Nyāyapraveśa* (ed. by B. B. Dhruva), G.O.S. No. 38, Baroda 1930, pp. 1–8.  
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**HTU:** *Hetutattvopadeśa* of Jitāri (ed. by G. Tucci in *Minor Buddhist Texts*) Part I, Serie Orientale Roma 9, Rome 1956, pp. 261–274.  
**JRAS:** *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London.  
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**M:** Mironov, N. D., ‘*Nyāyapraveśa* I, Sanskrit text, edited and reconstructed’, *T'oung Pao*, Leiden 1931, pp. 1–24.  
**NB:** *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti (ed. by D. Malvania). Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 2, Patna 1955.  
**NM:** *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga, Chinese version by Hsüan Tsang. T. No. 1628, 32, 1–6.  
**NP:** *Nyāyapraveśa* of Śāṅkarasvāmin.  
**NPV:** *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* of Hariḥbhadrā (ed. by B. Dhruva), included in G.O.S. No. 38, Baroda 1930.  
**NV:** *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. 18, Calcutta 1936.  
**PBh:** *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Vol. 4, Benares 1895.  
**PS:** *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, Tibetan version by Kanakavarman, *Tibetan Tripitaka*, Peking edition, Reprint, No. 5700.  
**SK:** *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. 15.  
**SV:** *Ślokavārttika* of Kumāṛila. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 11, Benares 1898.  
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**V:** The text of the *Nyāyapraveśa* included in *NPV*.  
**VS:** *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda (ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya), G.O.S. No. 136, Baroda 1961.  
**Yin:** K'uei Chi, *Yin ming ju cheng li lun shu* T. No. 1840, 44, 91–143.